Contrary to popular belief, the Iran report is a vindication

The National Intelligence Estimate has stated that Iran dismantled its nuclear weapons program in 2003. And somehow this is viewed by pundits as damaging to Bush. Opponents of the president are saying that the NIE is evidence that the Bush strategy should be changed. Am I missing something here? If the NIE is correct (which some other nations have disagreed with), then it means that Iran had an active nuclear weapons program prior to 2003, but then ended the program that year. Seriously, am I missing something? When George W. Bush came to office, Iran had a nuclear weapons program. Close to the end of George W. Bush's administration, Iran has discontinued its nuclear weapons program. How is this an indictment of Bush's policies? Shouldn't it be proof that his policies work? Now if the estimate said that Iran had no program prior to 2003, but has recently been engaging in nuclear weapons development, would the story be that we need more of Bush's policies? If that was the case, I might be inclined to argue that our current strategy is not working. But that is not the case, apparently.

Consider This
Anybody care to remember what happened in 2003? I mean other than the fact that Iran apparently discontinued its nuclear weapons program. Yes, the United States, under the "war monger" Bush invaded Iraq. The purpose was to get rid of weapons of mass destruction programs. As it turns out, Saddam had duped the entire world about the status of his WMD, although personal testimony from the man later indicated that he fully intended to restart WMD efforts after sanctions against Iraq were lifted. But that is a digression. Remember, the U.S. invaded Iraq in 2003 to get rid of WMD. In 2003, Iran discontinued its nuclear WMD program. Does anyone seriously think that having U.S. and allied troops along both borders had nothing to do with this decision? Was it just coincidence that the Ayatollahs awoke one morning in 2003 and decided that now would be the time to stop their pursuit of the bomb?

Unless you're a Democrat Senator, you must see that the U.S. presence in Iraq, and the aggressive action the Bush administration has taken against terror groups and rouge states, led to Iran giving up WMD. That really is accomplishing a mission.

Don't Back Down
Now we hear calls that, because of an NIE (that some nations dispute), we must change our strategy toward Iran. Cowboy George should back down. Well, as it so happens, the Cowboys have the best record in the NFC this year, and Bush's strategy seems to have been working quite well. Obviously all the more reason to change it, right?

Excuse the football allusions today, but this situation is like having a championship team playing a pesky competitor. The competitor has hung around all day, kept it close, willing to grind it out, but them their efforts at the short end of the scoreboard. With four minutes left in the 4th quarter, and a four-point lead, would the championship team be content to suddenly let-up? To go three-and-out and give the ball up? To change their tactics from what has been working to something else? If that happened, and the champions lost the big game, the coach might be fired. Yet is exactly what Bush opponents are suggesting.

For all of you who need a legend to follow the above scenario, please see as follows:
Championship Team = United States
Pesky Competitor = Iran
Bush opponents = crazy

Now, of all times, when we might actually have Iran on the ropes (there's a boxing metaphor for you), when their crazy little president is experiencing ever-increasing unpopularity, when we have heads of state in Europe that might actually back up international pressures, when some major international players even have their doubts about a country that has sped-up its uranium enrichment, why would it be a good idea to change course now?

Legacy - Averting WWIII
A headline on the Drudge Report today stated "WWIII on hold?" A few weeks ago, President Bush stated that should Iran acquire the ability to produce nuclear weapons, the likely outcome would be World War III. And who is to argue that point? So if the policies pursued by the Bush administration - sometimes near-unilaterally - resulted in the suspension of activities that could have led to geopolitical cataclysm, should this not be the stuff that legacies are made of? The great war monger may have actually have prevented the great war. The strategy of security through strength hasn't looked this good since the Iron Curtain fell.

Pakistan, Pakistan - What to do?

I agree that the most dangerous nation in the world today is Pakistan. Most would say Iran. I agree that the Iranian regime is the most dangerous government currently in power. However, if we take a purely situational stance, then Pakistan wins hands down. And that is not a difficult conclusion to ascertain. Consider that:

1. Pakistan maintains a small but nonetheless dangerous arsenal of nuclear weapons.
2. A significant number the Pakistanis, particularly in the more rural provinces removed from Islamabad and Karachi, support an Islamic/Taliban political movement.
3. Pakistan has primarily a Sunni Muslim population - a more friendly environment for al Qaeda.
4. Pakistan's current strongman, Pervez Musharraf, will be likely victim of coup, assassination, or forced exile.
5. In the event Musharraf does lose power, there will most likely be a vacuum for a time. Even if a "moderate" style government does emerge, there will be chaos in the change of power.

Pakistan is close to being Taliban-Afghanistan on steroids.

So what can the United States, have a huge vested interest in the situation, do? For one, we can continue to support Musharraf as much as possible. While we do have a legitimate gripe that he has not done all he can to support our war against al Qaeda, critics should realize that the general has also not done all he could to impede our war. Frankly, given the political environment, Musharraf has probably done the best he can. There's no doubt he has allowed, or "looked the other way" while CIA and special forces roam the boarder region with Afghanistan. He didn't impede our efforts to break up the nuclear engineering program that was being shopped out by rouge scientists, and by all accounts, the country's nukes are still under lock and key. In fact, indications point to a clandestine partnership with U.S. security forces to guard the weapons.

So, back to the original question - what to do? Honestly, I do like the approach the administration has taken thus-far. Publicly, they are telling Musharraf to return to democratic reforms, hold elections, etc. All while not demanding firm timetables. Privately, the state department seems to be doing what it can to stave off Musharraf opposition forces and solidify the General's tenuous hold on power.

However, for a more medium/long term perspective, the U.S. must have a plan to deal with the Pakistani issue. This is not only in the national interests of the U.S., but is paramount for all of Western Civilization. Which is where the issue becomes exceedingly complicated.

In some ways, it would have been preferable had this situation existed in Afghanistan rather than Pakistan, mainly due to the Indian factor. Tensions between the two nations have subsided in the past year or so, but this is in absence of a real solution to the Kashmir problem. Both nations have nuclear weapons technology, although Pakistan's are merely for deterrent purposes. Mildly put, Indian Hindus and Pakistani Muslims don't like each other. But the real issue is not relations between the subcontinent nations, but their individual relations to the United States. In the current environment, Pakistan is a key "ally" in the war against Islamic fascism, and U.S. security is linked to the stability of a moderate government there. India is much less important from a security standpoint, but exponentially more important - now and in the future - as an economic partner. India represents a huge and growing market for American goods and services with the red-tape and protectionist measures, and currency manipulation associated with red China. Beyond this, the potential for America as a market for Indian industry provides an excellent counterbalance to China, preventing the Chinese from having a quasi-import monopoly.

All this to say, the U.S. relationship with Pakistan cannot damage our relations with India, and vice versa. All of this makes for very, very tricky diplomacy.

A Pakistani Nuclear Missile

Although I am not as emphatically opposed to "nation-building" as some in the conservative school, I do not believe in nation-building should be engaged without clear reason, and certainly not in a situation that could likely backfire on the U.S. In Iraq and Afghanistan, situations on the ground and in the region made nation-building make sense. In Pakistan, it does not. Attempting to implement the strategy of Iraq and Afghanistan has the potential to alienate India, and would put Pakistan's WMD in danger of being lost to nefarious forces.

Our number one priority in Pakistan should be ensuring the security of their nuclear weapons program, with a contingency to quickly - via military means - destroy the programs and the weapons in the event of a Taliban-type takeover of the government. Secondly, we should seek to steer clear from the Kashmir dispute. While the conflict does have regional/international implications, it is at its heart a local dispute between two sovereign nations. Only in the event that Islamic fascists use the issue to attempt to gain a power foothold should we intervene.

Finally, stability and a slow trend toward democratic reforms is much preferable to radical democratic imposition. Just as Musharraf leaving would create a vacuum, a fast move to democracy would have the same effect. We want the Pakistanis to be free, but we cannot afford to have their freedom hijacked by pro-Taliban forces.

In the end, there are no "good" answers to the Pakistan problem. Ultimately, we must secure their nukes, do what we can to promote stability, and deal with hostile forces there when and where we can.