Pakistan, Pakistan - Phase 2

Former Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto was recently assassinated following a political rally in Islamabad. Ms. Bhutto had recently returned to her home country from self-imposed exile to lead a political party dedicated to democratic reforms and generally opposed to the government of President and former army Chief Pervez Musharaff.

The Manifest takes special interest, as should all Westerners, in the events in Pakistan. As detailed in a former post on the situation in Pakistan, it is noted that the Islamic nation is, for all intents and purposes, the flashpoint of unrest in the world today. Pakistan is the "powder keg" of the early 21st century in the same manner as the Balkans were in the early 20th. The assassination of Bhutto could have many of the same ramifications of that of Archduke Francis Ferdinand.

A major difference, however, is that the Bhutto killing is a bit of a "whodunit." Al Qaeda has taken responsibility - at least a group claiming to be affiliated with Al Qaeda. If this is the truth, then it is the best possible scenario in terms of being beneficial to the West.

Don't misunderstand - I am not claiming that the assassination of Bhutto is a good thing. It is a major tragedy for her family, for the nation of Pakistan, and for the movement of democracy in the Muslim world. However, in the interests of peace and security in the West, most all parties agree that stability and a gradual move to democracy is preferable to radical change that could lead to a Taliban-led revolution. And nobody, save Al Qaeda, wants the Taliban with nukes.

This means that, for the time being, the best policy is to support Pervez Musharraf's hold on the presidency, and insist on orderly parliamentary elections. Musharraf, while walking a very thin tight rope in semi-opposing Islamic radicals in his country, has nonetheless been effective in preventing Pakistan's WMD from falling into the hands of Al Qaeda. Long known as an opponent of Pakistan's most influential political parties, it could be expected that all sides would jump at the chance to blame Musharraf for Bhutto's death. Any rational thinking person can understand this accusation is ludicrous. Bhutto as prime minister was not real threat to Musharraf. In fact, the Pakistani president would probably have much rather had Bhutto and her party in charge of parliament than his other chief rival, Nawaz Sharif. Sharif was originally disposed in the coup that General Musharraf staged to gain control of the government. Sharif heads an Islamic party that supports Sharia-style governance. One does not have to make a big leap from Sharif government to a Taliban government. There was no guarantee that Bhutto's party would have won a majority in parliament, and the likely outcome would have most likely have been a power-sharing arrange between Bhutto's quasi-secular party, and Sharif's Islamic party. Sure a split in parliament could have only increased Musharaff's influence in the presidency.

When I first heard news of Bhutto's assassination, my first thought was that she was killed by her own party. Dogged by corruption charges (which may have been partially true), being a female in a society with made up of at least 50% Islamic fundamentalists, and her distinctly un-democratic control of her political party could have contributed to other leadership wanting her out of the way. Perhaps killing the party leader - and then pointing fingers at the government - could produce a tidal wave of support in the upcoming elections, allowing the party to easily sweep Sharif's party.

Sharif himself was among the first and loudest to publicly decry the murder, and to point a finger at the government. This also seemed to me to be a red flag. Sharif's Islamic party would be radically opposed to a female prime minister, and strongly advocate a regime of Sharia law. By killing the leader of the opposition - an opposition which coalesced around the personality of Bhutto - then Sharif could very well remove the obstacle that would have caused a power-sharing arrangement, leaving a one-on-one battle with Musharraf.

I suspect that either of these scenarios could still be true, but at the moment it seems that we should take Al Qaeda at its word. And back to my point that this would be the best outcome. Musharraf ordering Bhutto's murder would have been a disaster. Should proof be produced, he would be chased from office, and the country would fall to Islamic radicals. Should Sharif have ordered the murder, he would have gained support of the Taliban elements in the country, even moreso that he currently has, and most likely of swept into power. Al Qaeda will definitely have support within Pakistan for what they did, but there will also be outrage among many Pakistanis who might otherwise be indifferent.

As cold-hearted as this sounds, civil war within the Islamic world (which is the kind that Al Qaeda has been waging since the invasion of Iraq) is much preferable to a united front attacking Western interests and homelands. If any good is to come from the tragedy of Mrs. Bhutto's murder, it would be a sizable portion of Pakistanis turning on Al Qaeda/Taliban in the manner that has happened in many of the provinces of Iraq. That may be the best answer to solving the problem of the Pakistani powder keg.

Pakistan, Pakistan - What to do?

I agree that the most dangerous nation in the world today is Pakistan. Most would say Iran. I agree that the Iranian regime is the most dangerous government currently in power. However, if we take a purely situational stance, then Pakistan wins hands down. And that is not a difficult conclusion to ascertain. Consider that:

1. Pakistan maintains a small but nonetheless dangerous arsenal of nuclear weapons.
2. A significant number the Pakistanis, particularly in the more rural provinces removed from Islamabad and Karachi, support an Islamic/Taliban political movement.
3. Pakistan has primarily a Sunni Muslim population - a more friendly environment for al Qaeda.
4. Pakistan's current strongman, Pervez Musharraf, will be likely victim of coup, assassination, or forced exile.
5. In the event Musharraf does lose power, there will most likely be a vacuum for a time. Even if a "moderate" style government does emerge, there will be chaos in the change of power.

Pakistan is close to being Taliban-Afghanistan on steroids.

So what can the United States, have a huge vested interest in the situation, do? For one, we can continue to support Musharraf as much as possible. While we do have a legitimate gripe that he has not done all he can to support our war against al Qaeda, critics should realize that the general has also not done all he could to impede our war. Frankly, given the political environment, Musharraf has probably done the best he can. There's no doubt he has allowed, or "looked the other way" while CIA and special forces roam the boarder region with Afghanistan. He didn't impede our efforts to break up the nuclear engineering program that was being shopped out by rouge scientists, and by all accounts, the country's nukes are still under lock and key. In fact, indications point to a clandestine partnership with U.S. security forces to guard the weapons.

So, back to the original question - what to do? Honestly, I do like the approach the administration has taken thus-far. Publicly, they are telling Musharraf to return to democratic reforms, hold elections, etc. All while not demanding firm timetables. Privately, the state department seems to be doing what it can to stave off Musharraf opposition forces and solidify the General's tenuous hold on power.

However, for a more medium/long term perspective, the U.S. must have a plan to deal with the Pakistani issue. This is not only in the national interests of the U.S., but is paramount for all of Western Civilization. Which is where the issue becomes exceedingly complicated.

In some ways, it would have been preferable had this situation existed in Afghanistan rather than Pakistan, mainly due to the Indian factor. Tensions between the two nations have subsided in the past year or so, but this is in absence of a real solution to the Kashmir problem. Both nations have nuclear weapons technology, although Pakistan's are merely for deterrent purposes. Mildly put, Indian Hindus and Pakistani Muslims don't like each other. But the real issue is not relations between the subcontinent nations, but their individual relations to the United States. In the current environment, Pakistan is a key "ally" in the war against Islamic fascism, and U.S. security is linked to the stability of a moderate government there. India is much less important from a security standpoint, but exponentially more important - now and in the future - as an economic partner. India represents a huge and growing market for American goods and services with the red-tape and protectionist measures, and currency manipulation associated with red China. Beyond this, the potential for America as a market for Indian industry provides an excellent counterbalance to China, preventing the Chinese from having a quasi-import monopoly.

All this to say, the U.S. relationship with Pakistan cannot damage our relations with India, and vice versa. All of this makes for very, very tricky diplomacy.

A Pakistani Nuclear Missile

Although I am not as emphatically opposed to "nation-building" as some in the conservative school, I do not believe in nation-building should be engaged without clear reason, and certainly not in a situation that could likely backfire on the U.S. In Iraq and Afghanistan, situations on the ground and in the region made nation-building make sense. In Pakistan, it does not. Attempting to implement the strategy of Iraq and Afghanistan has the potential to alienate India, and would put Pakistan's WMD in danger of being lost to nefarious forces.

Our number one priority in Pakistan should be ensuring the security of their nuclear weapons program, with a contingency to quickly - via military means - destroy the programs and the weapons in the event of a Taliban-type takeover of the government. Secondly, we should seek to steer clear from the Kashmir dispute. While the conflict does have regional/international implications, it is at its heart a local dispute between two sovereign nations. Only in the event that Islamic fascists use the issue to attempt to gain a power foothold should we intervene.

Finally, stability and a slow trend toward democratic reforms is much preferable to radical democratic imposition. Just as Musharraf leaving would create a vacuum, a fast move to democracy would have the same effect. We want the Pakistanis to be free, but we cannot afford to have their freedom hijacked by pro-Taliban forces.

In the end, there are no "good" answers to the Pakistan problem. Ultimately, we must secure their nukes, do what we can to promote stability, and deal with hostile forces there when and where we can.